The Suez Canal Crisis was of utmost significance to approach that India had towards the region in general and the rise of Arab nationalism. India was unaware of the root causes that led to the crisis in the first place, and India has many lessons to learn from the way it was handled.
The crisis started when Egyptian territory was invaded by Israel, Britain and France on 29 October 1956. Although the crisis lasted only for 10 days, it was considered a moment of deep anxiety for India and indeed for relations between newly independent or rapidly decolonising states and their former colonisers
Nehru expressed his views regarding the crisis to John Foster Dulles, ‘the whole future of the relations between Europe and Asia’ hung in the balance. The Indian government expected to be affected both economically and politically, as any ‘restriction of traffic through the canal or blockade or imposition of higher tolls would have (had) harmful results and might (have) even prejudice (d) the progress of the Second Five Year Plan.
In 1956, the economic progress of Egypt was depended mainly on guiding the flooding of the Nile, which was to be attained by completing the building of the Aswan Dam across the river. The Soviets and the Americans, who had initially proposed to grant economic support for building the dam, withdrew support due to economic incapacity of Egypt.
The President of Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser, was angry at the fact that even though former colonisers and the post-war super powers were earning good profit from traffic through the canal’s waterways, none was coming ahead to fund the dam. In forceful retaliation, he announced nationalising the Suez Canal and that Egypt would build its own dam. Nehru, being unaware of Nasser’s planned response, decided to distance India from being perceived as being complicit in this decision.
India after Independence had developed a special relationship with Egypt. As Nasser came to power in 1954, western powers started mocking him as an ‘Asiatic Mussolini,’ ‘imitator of Hitler’ and a ‘would-be dictator.’ Interestingly, Nasser’s Arab nationalism was also seen a threat to their interests in Africa, and, indeed, in West Asia by both London and Paris. India, on the other hand, sensed a chance to build wider and friendlier relations within the region under ‘the wise leadership of President Nasser’
India’s Successful Diplomacy
Understanding the Nehru’s idea of ‘spirit of brotherliness’, Nasser counted heavily on Nehru for guidance on issues of international security. The Arab–Israeli conflict was the most prominent subject of talks between the two, especially that the ‘Gaza strip was totally indefensible’, with Nasser concerned that ‘ever since Ben Gurion’s come back, Israel had become more and more aggressive.’ In addition, India also maintained its distance from the Western position on Israel and had instead made efforts to inspire secular nationalism in West Asia.
Considering Nasser as a potential partner in the process of developing regional security, Nehru had advised Nasser not to join any defence pacts and instead adopt a non-aligned posture. In its early years of collaboration, Tito’s Yugoslavia, Nasser’s Egypt and Nehru’s India became a motif of the unity of the non-aligned across Europe, Africa and Asia.
Thus, when Nasser took the step of nationalising the canal, the burden fell on India to expect the worsening of the crisis. Nehru was, of course, of the view to ‘prevent hostilities and to have a peaceful settlement which would ensure the use of the Canal as before’ as he repetitively stressed.
Yet, the British and the French were decidedly adamant in their attitudes. Equally concerned with these developments, Eisenhower proposed that the British host a conference of interested and affected parties; this came to be known as the London Conference that, unfortunately, failed.
Not paying heed to the dialogues or the hearing to be conducted at the UN Security Council, Israel attacked Egyptian soil on October 29. Condemning the conflict, Britain and France initially issued ultimatums to both Israel and Egypt, but later supported Israel in the attack on Egyptian airfields only two days later.
Shocked and provoked by this ‘dastardly action’, Nehru took immediate measures to stop the conflict. Nehru was aware of the fact that Egyptian military was losing it feet and that ‘Nasser proposed to lay down his life fighting.’ Thus in a hush-hush move, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Arthur Lall, was directed to actively court collaboration with the Egyptian delegate Omar Loutfi. The Uniting for Peace resolution, backed by USA, passed on 2 November 2 1956, dragged fighting forces behind armistice lines, and proposed the way for what came to be known as the Eisenhower–Nehru formula.
In an effort to end the war, the US kept on moving with its heft at the UN in handling western powers, while India brought on board Asian and African nations, resulting in moving a 19-member Asian-African resolution two days later, urging full compliance with previous UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire.
The first UN peacekeeping force, the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I), was formed by the resolution moved by Canada, Columbia and Norway. As drawing troops from any of the five permanent members was not allowed, the structure of the UNEF I took on an urgent character and even the British invited India ‘to come in heavily and assist in bringing about a speedy settlement.
The Indian troops (a first instance for India to send armed troops for peacekeeping) left for the Suez on 15 November 1956 and was then positioned in the Sinai Peninsula. Indian peacekeepers built repute for themselves, acting as Nehru had besought them to, ‘with credit to India and her gallant army.’
India’s continual demands for the decolonisation of Asia and Africa at the UN and India’s support of the Egyptian position did not hinder her from discussing with both sides, helping substantially in closing the crisis. It also cast India’s relations with West Asia in a certain mould, altered only recently with India’s perceived closeness with and adoration of Israel.
India’s experience in Suez has been essential in gaining global repute by being noncommittal, and at the same time being engaged at the level of the UN, a policy known at the time as non-alignment.
Following exacting and exhaustive debates, main elements of the policy that are of relevance to Indian diplomacy towards that region could be rescued and restituted. In fashioning that foreign policy, growth can only be attained by focussing on the antecedents of India’s relations with that particular region, and certainly not with hubris toward its history